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The majority of aviation accidents are still attributed to human error, with flight
crew actions accounting for the majority of these mishaps. The Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) has identified 12 behavioral traps that can ensnare even
experienced pilots. This study examined the FAA-defined behavioral traps and
the regularity with which they occurred in flight crew related accidents. The top
three traps were Neglect of Flight Planning, Preflight Inspection, and Checklists;
Loss of Positional or Situational Awareness; and Getting Behind the Aircraft,
which were found in 72%, 61%, and 48% of aviation accidents, respectively. The
results showed the contributing factors of training inadequacies/lack of Crew
Resource Management, night, and low ceiling and/or visibility compounded the
effects of the unsafe attitudes. These conditions were found in 48%, 46%, and
42% of accidents, respectively.
Approximately three out of four aviation accidents result from human error (FAA, 2009).
The FAA uses studies in human behavior in an effort to reduce human error in aviation
accidents. Flying consists of decision making activities, some of which are routine, others more
complex. Effective aeronautical decision making (ADM) is essential to flight safety. The first
two steps of ADM are “(1) identifying personal attitudes hazardous to safe flight and (2) learning
behavior modification techniques” (FAA, 2009, p. 5-3).
Unsafe pilot behaviors have been part of FAA literature since the foundations of ADM.
The concept of hazardous attitudes refers to pilot personality factors that may affect decision
making and judgment. These attitudes include macho, anti-authority, impulsivity, resignation,
and invulnerability. Behavioral traps (refer to Table 1) are operational pitfalls to which aviators
may fall prey as a result of bad decision making, often leading to negative consequences.
Literature Review
Helmreich and Foushee (1993) found that flight crew actions were the cause in more than
70% of accidents between 1959 and 1989. Wetmore and Lu (2006) studied fatal general aviation
(GA) accidents and found that hazardous attitudes have a devastating effect on risk management,
decision making, and the utilization of all resources, three of the most important skills in Crew
Resource Management (CRM).

Table 1.
Overview of Behavioral Traps as defined by the FAA (2008, p. 9-12)
Behavioral Trap
Peer Pressure

Definition
Poor decision making may be based upon an emotional response to peers, rather
than evaluating a situation objectively.
Mind Set
A pilot displays mind set through an inability to recognize and cope with changes
in a given situation.
Get-There-Itis
This disposition impairs pilot judgment through a fixation on the original goal
(destination), including a disregard for any alternative action.
Duck-Under Syndrome A pilot may be tempted to make it into an airport by descending below minimums
during an approach. A pilot may believe that there is a built-in margin of error in
every approach procedure, or a pilot may not want to admit that the landing cannot
be completed […].
Scud Running
This occurs when a pilot tries to maintain visual contact with the terrain at low
altitudes while instrument conditions exist.
Continuing Visual
Spatial disorientation or collision with ground/obstacles may occur when a pilot
Flight Rules (VFR)
continues VFR into instrument conditions. This can be even more dangerous if the
into Instrument
pilot is not instrument rated or current.
Conditions
Getting Behind the
This pitfall can be caused by allowing events or the situation to control pilot
Aircraft
actions. A constant state of surprise at what happens next may be exhibited when
the pilot is getting behind the aircraft.
Loss of Positional or In extreme cases, getting behind the aircraft results in a loss of positional or
Situational Awareness situational awareness. The pilot may not know the aircraft’s geographical location
or may be unable to recognize deteriorating circumstances.
Operating without
Ignoring minimum fuel reserve requirements is usually the result of
Adequate Fuel
overconfidence, lack of flight planning, or disregard of regulations.
Reserves
Descent Below the
The duck-under syndrome, as mentioned above, can also occur during the en route
Minimum En Route
portion of an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) flight.
Altitude
Flying Outside the
The assumed high-performance capability of a particular aircraft may cause a
Envelope
mistaken belief that it can meet the demands imposed by a pilot’s overestimated
flying skills.
Neglect of Flight
A pilot may rely on short- and long-term memory, regular flying skills, and
Planning, Preflight
familiar routes instead of established procedures and published checklists. This
Inspections, and
can be particularly true of experienced pilots.
Checklists

The understanding of individual pilot attitudes and their role in CRM still requires further
research (Salas, Shuffler, & Diaz, 2010). The study of unsafe pilot attitudes has extended over
three decades (Casner, 2010; Hunter, 2005; Lester & Bombaci, 1984; Murray, 1999). However,
much has been limited to GA and to the hazardous attitudes. This study examined pilot
behavioral traps in the multi-crew environment and aimed to see with what regularity behavioral
traps were extant in crew-related aviation accidents. The specific research questions were:
1. Which behavioral traps are present, and with what frequency do these occur, in flight
crew related accidents?

2. What relationships exist between the pilot behavioral traps and the contributing factors to
aviation accidents?
Methodology
The study used archival methods to explore the behavioral traps contributing to flight
crew accidents. The primary data source was the Flight Safety Foundation’s (FSF) accident
report archives. Research focused on FSF’s Accident Prevention periodical, which cataloged 218
accidents from 1988 to 2006. From a total of 218 reports, 110 were determined to have flight
crew-related causes. Using the Krejcie and Morgan (1970) formula, an appropriate sample of
reports to review consisted of 83 accidents attributed partly or wholly to flight crew error. A
description of the dataset and the database itself can be obtained at the FSF website
(http://flightsafety.org).
The research team analyzed the accident reports to determine the presence of a primary
behavioral trap, then wherever applicable, any secondary behavioral traps that may have been
contributory. The researchers also identified contributing situational factors, such as weather,
training/CRM, maintenance, etc., that may have exacerbated the effect of the behavioral traps.
The researchers employed a priori codes, specifically, the FAA-defined behavioral traps. Once
the coding process was completed, the research team explored any relationships among them
with the contributing factors. All the relevant information from the accident reports was entered
into NVivo (v. 10), a computer-aided qualitative data analysis software. The use of such software
allowed for a second stage of coding where themes began to emerge (e.g., contributing factors)
in conjunction with the behavioral traps themselves.
Results
Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 shows the frequency with which behavioral traps were present in the 83 accident
reports as either a primary or secondary behavior. A primary behavior is a flight crewmember
action or inaction which is most closely related to the investigative agency’s accident probable
cause. Accidents are usually the result of a series of events that each add operational risk. Thus,
secondary behavioral traps are actions contributing to the accident but not directly associated to
the investigative agency’s probable or primary cause statement. The three most prevalent traps
were Neglect of Flight Planning, Preflight Inspection and Checklist; Loss of Positional or
Situational Awareness; and Getting Behind the Aircraft.
While night was tracked separately, darkness can be considered a contributory factor and
was included in Figure 1 showing the frequency of occurrence of the contributing factors.
Results showed that training inadequacies/lack of CRM, night, or low ceiling and/or visibility
compounded the effects of the unsafe attitudes; these conditions were found in 48%, 46%, and
42% of accidents, respectively. The other category included miscellaneous conditions such as
medical issues, optical illusions, etc.

Table 2.
Frequency Count of Behavioral Traps in FSF Accident Reports.
Behavioral Trap
00-Neglect of Flight Planning, Preflight Inspections, Checklists
01-Peer Pressure
02-MindSet
03-Get-There-It is
04-Duck-Under Syndrome
05-Scud Running
06-Continuing VFR into IMC
07-Getting Behind the Aircraft
08-Loss of Positional or Situational Awareness
09-Operating Without Adequate Fuel Reserves
10-Descent below the MEA
11-Flying outside the Envelope

Primary
32
2
5
2
5
0
2
12
19
1
1
2

Secondary
30
1
18
9
3
1
2
28
34
0
1
7

45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0

Figure 1. Contributory factors across all cases.
Relational Analysis Results
The research team became interested in exploring the relationships between the most
prevalent behavioral traps and the contributing factors most present during the aviation
accidents. Cluster analyses are good visualization tools based on the frequency with which words
or coding are shared in the coded text. Figure 2 explored these relationships between the primary
behavioral traps and low ceiling and/or visibility while Figure 3 explored the association
between the primary behavioral traps and the crews’ training inadequacies (lack of CRM).
The Figure 2 dendogram indicates how sources of information have coding similarities,
which in turn could suggest relationships between two concepts. The proximity to, and color of
codes within the diagram, suggest associations among the concepts. Low ceiling and/or low
visibility is near, and shares the same color, to the behavioral trap known as Loss of Positional or

Situational Awareness. These connections are not difficult to comprehend since having
restrictions to visibility could logically contribute to loss of positional awareness.
CRM is the ultimate expression of teamwork between flight crewmembers. Good CRM
practices are predicated on following checklists, standard procedures, conducting good preflight,
and engaging in proper flight planning to prepare for unexpected events. Not surprisingly, Figure
3 illustrated a relationship between training inadequacies (lack of CRM) and the behavioral trap
known as Neglect of Flight Planning, Preflight Inspection, and Checklists.

Figure 2. Cluster analysis between low ceiling and/or visibility and the behavioral traps.

Figure 3. Cluster analysis between training inadequacies (lack of CRM) and the behavioral traps.
Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
Behavioral traps were not present in a uniform distribution in the accident reports
analyzed. In fact, three of them, Neglect of Flight Planning, Preflight Inspection, and Checklist,
Getting Behind the Aircraft, and Loss of Positional or Situational Awareness accounted for 63
(over 75%) of the primary behavioral traps, and as secondary behavioral traps, they each
appeared in over one-third of the cases. In all but three accidents considered, one or more
contributing factors were present. One could infer that behavioral traps are exacerbated by
adverse environmental factors.

The researchers found relationships between restrictions to vision (e.g., night conditions,
low visibility/ceilings) with the behavioral trap known as Loss of Positional or Situational
Awareness. The fact that restrictions to vision is still a factor in many accidents may prompt the
FAA to research and develop training or public awareness on how to improve overall situational
awareness during conditions such as these and study technological enhancements. The link found
between training inadequacies and the trap known as Neglect of Flight Planning, Preflight
Inspection, and Checklists suggests that some pilots are not employing effective teamwork
practices, rules, and standard procedures.
From the standpoint of accident prevention, training and education focused on the top
behavioral traps would likely prove to have the highest payoff. Knowledge of how these
behavioral traps manifest themselves in crews can re-focus portions of CRM teaching to include
cognitive biases training and/or hazardous behavior identification and modification techniques.
Currently, the FAA lacks standardization for CRM training and guidelines concerning attitude
management. The present study of behavioral traps could provide an excellent starting point.
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